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Common wisdom suggests that ﬁrms’ internal organization has profound eﬀects on pro-
ductivity, eﬃciency and industry structure. Stemming from the seminal contributions by
Coase (1937), Williamson (1985), Klein et al. (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1986), many scholars have pushed forward the agenda of understanding orga-
nizational design and its eﬀects on ﬁrms’ performance. Over the past decades, a growing
interest in the link between delegation and innovative activities has soared, stimulated by
the pace of technological progress and the widespread move towards forms of work organi-
zation inside the ﬁrm that award more autonomy and responsibility to managers. Evidence
of the signiﬁcant shift towards decentralized organizational forms has, in fact, been largely
documented by the recent empirical literature — for instance, Rajan and Wulf (2005), Bres-
nahan et al. (2002) and Caroli and Van Reenen (2004). Yet, while the existing theoretical
literature on this ground has explored various aspects of the link between organization de-
sign and managerial initiative, the empirical validation of its predictions is still an open and
challenging question.
The objective of this paper is to make a step forward in this direction. We use a sam-
ple of Italian manufacturing collected in surveys distributed in 1997, 2000 and 2003 by an
Italian investment bank, Mediocredito Centrale, to study three speciﬁc features of the link
between R&D, delegation and its determinants. More precisely, building on the belief that
less hierarchical organizations stimulate managerial initiative we document a robust positive
correlation between delegation of decisions within organizations and incentives for innova-
tion. Moreover, in contrast with some predictions of the theoretical insights of the literature
studying the link between corporate governance and the distribution of power along ﬁrms’
control chain, we also document a negative correlation between delegation and ownership
dispersion. Finally, we show that some recently empirical regularities concerning the de-
terminants of delegation are not detected in our data. Speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings provide
surprisingly little support to the view that ﬁrms’ age, their distance from the technological
frontier and the heterogeneity of the environment in which these operate, can explain vari-
ability in delegation measures across ﬁrms and industries. On the other hand, in the context
of the Italian manufacturing sector, ownership dispersion is a very important determinant
of delegation.
This evidence seems interesting for three main reasons. First, by showing that there exists
a robust positive correlation between delegation and R&D, our analysis complements, and
actually reinforces, the results of the previous literature emphasizing that vertical control
2is negatively correlated with the diﬀusion of new technologies, as for instance documented
by Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenan and Zilibotti (2007). Second, the negative
correlation between delegation and ownership dispersion suggests that delegation in the
Italian manufacturing sector, where ﬁrms are typically of small size and family owned, has
somewhat diﬀerent roots relative to large corporations studied in Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
Finally, by not being able to verify some of the main ﬁndings of the recent literature on the
determinants of delegation on a data set from a diﬀerent country, the evidence collected in
our paper also suggests that more work, both empirical and theoretical, must be done in the
direction of cross-country comparisons.
Our results are related to the recent and growing empirical literature investigating the
determinants of ﬁrms’ internal organization. Using US data, Rajan and Wulf (2005) provide
empirical evidence that ﬁrms tend to select ﬂatter organizational structures in more recent
years relative to the past. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and Caroli and Van
Reenen (2001) ﬁnd that with more adoption of information technology (and human capital),
ﬁrms also tend to adopt more decentralized organizational structure. On a similar note,
Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) ﬁnd that with the adoption of new technology in trucking
that allows for better monitoring, incentive-improving features of this technology pushed
hauls toward in-house owned trucks, while the resource-allocation-improving features pushed
them toward for-hire carriage, suggesting that the organizational form is indeed closely
related to technology adoption. Finally, Colombo and Delmastro (2004) test empirically
some predictions of economic theory with respect to delegation of authority within a ﬁrm,
concluding that the managers’ informational advantage seems to be a key determinant of
delegation.
All these papers mainly address questions about ﬁrms’ organization structure and its
determinants, but they are mute on the link between delegation and more direct measures
of R&D, a question that will be central to our analysis. Moreover, while they have system-
atically overlooked the link between ownership concentration and delegation, our data set
allows us to explicitly account for this intriguing relationship.
The contribution which is probably most closely related to our work is Acemoglu et al.
(2007), who document a robust positive correlation between delegation and innovation using
data from the French and British manufacturing sector. There are two main qualitative
diﬀerences between our work and this paper. First, while Acemoglu et al. investigate the
impact that the distance of the ﬁrm from the technology frontier has on various decentraliza-
tion measures, we focus on the relationship between direct measures of ﬁrms’ R&D activities
and delegation. Second, our data does not seem to provide evidence for their main ﬁndings.
3That is that ﬁrms’ age, their distance from the technology frontier, and the uncertainty of the
environment in which ﬁrms operate are important determinants of delegation. As we shall
argue, one possible source of this discrepancy, which opens new theoretical issues linking
delegation and ﬁrms’ characteristics such as the nature of corporate control, is the peculiar-
ity of the Italian manufacturing sectors, which is mainly formed by small or family owned
ﬁrms. In this perspective our results also suggest that more empirical work on cross-country
comparisons must be done on this ground to identify more carefully the hidden sources of
these diﬀerences (a direction recently taken in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009).
The theoretical background upon which our empirical analysis rests is mainly composed
by two strands of literature. As regards the link between delegation and managerial ini-
tiative, in a simple agency model Riordan (1990) was the ﬁrst to formalize the idea that
delegation has beneﬁcial eﬀects on cost reduction incentives. Riordan shows that although
vertical control might provide more eﬃcient output decisions, it undermines managerial in-
centives for cost reduction. He argued that, in those instances where ex ante and ex post
eﬃciency are incompatible, the ownership structure matters. Essentially, when contracts are
incomplete, owners can stimulate managerial initiative only by leaving higher information
rents to their managers: Arms’ length relationships spur R&D incentives. The subsequent
agency literature has developed these insights by studying the conditions under which dele-
gated contracting can replicate and sometimes even deliver better outcomes than centralized
contracting (Baron and Besanko, 1992, and Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1997,
Laﬀont and Martimort, 1998, Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2007, Martimort and Piccolo
2007 and 2009, among others). Building on the idea that managers have superior infor-
mation relative to shareholders, and that these latter can control the innovation process
only to a limited extent, these papers have oﬀered an ample range of results showing that
not only arms’ length relationships stimulate managerial initiative, but they can also be
ex ante preferable to monitoring intensive arrangements. On a similar note, other scholars
have looked at these trade-oﬀs by emphasizing the informational advantages of delegation
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1999, Rajan and Zingales, 2001,
Dessein, 2002, and Hart and Moore, 2005). By exploiting the same kind of trade-oﬀs under-
scored by Riordan, these papers show that delegation may be more eﬀective than vertical
control in providing incentives for information gathering.
We shall base our empirical investigation on these insights rather than following the ap-
proach taken in Acemoglu et al. (2007), whose theoretical model postulates an inverse rela-
tionship relative to what Riordan’s agency model would deliver, that is, delegation decisions
aﬀect innovation and not the opposite. The causality relationship upon which Acemoglu
4et al. build their analysis requires the hypothesis that diﬀerent, but exogenous information
structures rationalize alternative internal organizations: we shall take the opposite view.1
Concerning the link between delegation and ownership dispersion, our results contribute
to the large literature on corporate control and managerial incentives. Following the seminal
contribution by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), many theoretical papers have studied the link
between shareholders’ control and managerial initiative. Building on a simple free riding
story, Shleifer and Vishny argued that in a corporation with many small owners, it may not
pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. Instead, the presence
of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-riding problem. This
suggests that a positive correlation between delegation and ownership concentration should
be detected. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings seem to reject this view as long as ﬁrms are small
or family owned. In these cases we ﬁnd the opposite and quite robust correlation between
delegation and ownership dispersion: It seems that, for small ﬁrms, the more concentrated
is ownership, the more initiative is left to managers. As observed in Burkart et al. (1997),
this ﬁnding seems to support the idea that the simple trade-oﬀ between ownership concen-
tration and delegation emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny might in practice involve more
complex forces. For instance, the positive correlation between ownership concentration and
delegation found in our data could simply reﬂect the fact that tighter control by sharehold-
ers might constitute ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial incentives and
non-contractible investments, whereby requiring implicit forms of compensation that could
be based on more managerial discretion. Otherwise, such positive correlation could simply
capture the idea that, in small ﬁrms (many of which might be family owned), as most of
those considered in our sample, delegation becomes an essential feature insofar as a single or
few owners cannot handle all administrative, ﬁnancial and innovative phases surrounding the
production process. In a nutshell, the evidence found suggests that in the future theoretical
work it might be worth analyzing models where the ﬁrms’ size, ownership structure and
corporate control policy interplay so as to determine ﬁrms’ speciﬁc decentralization modes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data from Italian
manufacturing sector. In Section 3 we present our data analysis and discuss the results.
Section 4 concludes.
1In the previous version of the paper we did provide an agency model with an endogenous information
structure driving our empirical analysis. This analysis is available upon request.
52 Data
2.1 Description
Our main data source is a sample of Italian ﬁrms in the manufacturing industry collected in
surveys distributed in years 1997, 2000 and 2003 by an Italian investment bank, Mediocredito
Centrale.2 The data set includes a representative sample of all ﬁrms with 10 to 500 employ-
ees, and a census of all ﬁrms with more than 500 employees.3 Overall, approximately 4,500
ﬁrms were surveyed in each wave4 and answered various questions from 3 distinct categories:
(i) balance sheet data, (ii) measurable company characteristics for each year in the 1995-2003
period (for example employment at various organizational levels, investment, R&D expen-
ditures etc.), and (iii) questionnaire data regarding ﬁrm’s relationship with customers and
suppliers, details on competitive environment, industry characteristics, ownership structure
and other qualitative information. The summary statistics of the variables that we will be
using are included in Table 1. For each ﬁrm, we observe regular data such as 5-digit indus-
try code, the total number of employees, total revenues, proﬁts etc. In addition, we also
have data on ﬁrms’ organization such as the number of managers employed by the ﬁrm at
each of the two highest levels and information about whether or not a number of impor-
tant ﬁnancial, administrative, R&D and business decisions within the ﬁrm are delegated or
made in a more centralized manner. Our data also includes the number of employees with
a university degree, and we use this variable to construct an index of human capital within
ﬁrms. In particular, we construct a variable Human Capital which is deﬁned as the fraction
of high-skilled employees (i.e., university-trained ones). We also have information about the
ownership structure of the ﬁrm. In particular, we observe ownership stakes of three largest
shareholders. Finally, we also deﬁne a Capital Intensity index as
Capital
Employees, where the capital
2The data set is described in more detail in the appendix.
3As observed by Audretsch and Vivarelli (1996), restricting attention to data on ﬁrms which may appear
small in size is not necessarily a drawback for analyzing R&D. Indeed, studies linking patent activity to ﬁrm
size do not generally support the hypothesis that larger ﬁrms make more or better R&D. Based on a study
of 2,852 American companies which registered 4,553 patents, Bound et al. (1984) found that small ﬁrms
(with less than $10 million in sales) accounted for 4.3 percent of sales but 5.7 percent of the patents. Such
results are not limited to the United States. Schwalbach and Zimmerman (1991) found that the propensity
to patent is smaller for the largest ﬁrms in West Germany than for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Moreover, in their 1988 and 1990 studies, Acs and Audretsch found that small ﬁrms (with fewer than 500
employees) contribute 2.38-times more innovations per employee than do their larger counterparts. Finally,
concerning the particular case of Italy, Archibugi, Cesaratto and Sirilli (1990) observe that ﬁrms with less
than 500 employees constituted 87.9% of the innovating ﬁrms in Italy during the years 1980-85 and the
45.9% of the highly innovating ﬁrms in the same period.
4Each wave contained separate questions for each of the three previous years.
6measure we use includes machinery and equipment, but not land and buildings.
The monetary variables were reported in millions of italian liras prior to 2001 and in
Euros thereafter. We convert liras into euros by dividing by 1,936.27, which was the rate
ﬁxed during the transition to euro. We used the CPI to express all monetary variables in
2003 prices.
The average ﬁrm in our sample has 222 employees, who are supervised by 13 managers.
The average annual revenue of ﬁrms in our sample is 27 million Euros and ﬁrms spend
on average 818,600 Euros on research and development annually5 The deﬁnition of R&D
expenditures used in the questionnaire is fairly broad: it includes expenditures on (i) product
innovation activities including introduction of new products and quality improvements of old
products; (ii) process innovation activities including introduction of new and more eﬃcient
production processes and quality improvements of old production processes; and (iii) any
activity linked to a better organization and management of innovations. The distribution
of R&D spending is skewed towards zero, with more than 75% of ﬁrms with positive R&D
expenditures spending less than 260,000 euros per year, 25% of ﬁrms spending less than
26,000 euros per year and the median being 77,500 euros. Since the distribution of R&D
expenditures is highely skewed (with a long, but thin right tail) we work with logarithms
in our analysis. About 90% of ﬁrms in our sample report that at least some decisions are
delegated within the ﬁrm rather than made by the headquarters or the owner. On average,
the workers with a university degree amount to about 8% of the total number of employees.
We complemented our sample with (cross-sectional) data from the Italian statistical oﬃce
(ISTAT) providing some additional covariates such as the number of female employees per
100 employees or value added in manufacturing 1999 on the provincional level. Our goal is
to use our data to investigate the relationship between delegation and R&D expenditures.
Let us now look in detail at the measure of delegation that we employ.
2.2 Measure of delegation
Throughout our empirical exercises, we use a traditional measure of delegation, which is
based on self-reported answers to questions related to the extent of managerial discretion
over ﬁrms’ main strategic decisions. Four questions in the questionnaire distributed among
ﬁrms ask whether or not administrative, ﬁnancial, business and R&D-related decisions within
ﬁrms are made autonomously by separate divisions. For each question the ﬁrms are asked to
5There are 677 ﬁrm-years, for which 0 R&D expenditures were reported and we include these observations
in the sample.
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median SD N
R&D Expenditures (in 1000s euro) 818.6 77.5 8,284.3 13,333
Del. Q1: Administrative 0.86 1.00 0.35 11,260
Del. Q2: Financial 0.81 1.00 0.39 11,248
Del. Q3: Commercial 0.85 1.00 0.36 11,230
Del. Q4: R&D 0.80 1.00 0.40 11,070
Delegation max(Q1-Q4) 0.90 1.00 0.30 9,666
Delegation max(Q1-Q3) 0.91 1.00 0.29 11,263
Workers 221.66 79.00 540.64 14,367
Revenues (in mil. euro) 27.2 5.4 142 39,484
Value Added per Empl/Year 59,847 51,670 42,682 12,117
Ownership Concentration 0.51 0.50 0.30 37,722
Human Capital 0.08 0.05 0.11 12,139
Capital per Empl 97,732 56,155 158,547 12,117
a All monetary variables are in euros deﬂated by CPI to 2003 prices.
b Variables Delegation Qx are a self-reported dummy variables if some important
decisions are delegated within a ﬁrm.
c Variable Ownership Concentration is deﬁned as the sum of squares of the (per cent)
stakes of three largest shareholders divided by 10,000.
e Variable Human Capital is the share of workers with university degree:
UnivDegree
Total Empl.
f Varying number of observations (ﬁrm-year) across variables is due to varying num-
ber of ﬁrms that responded to a given question for some year.
pick one of the options: “no delegation”, “intermediate level” and “high level” of delegation.
Using these answers we deﬁne several alternative measures. The ﬁrst is deﬁned as a dummy
variable which is equal to one if at least one of these questions is answered positively - either
medium or high level of delegation.6,7 This delegation measure is similar to the one used in
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2007).
Since we believe that out of the four questions about delegation available to us the decision
about R&D spending is probably closest related to the extent of discretion about ﬁnancial
decisions, we also run all of our exercises with a dummy variable if a ﬁrm reported to have
6We prefer not to use the average of the four answers as we are not certain if two positive answers
necessarily imply an ordinal ranking, i.e., “more delegation”, than one positive answer. A ﬁrm in which
“only” all ﬁnancial decisions are delegated may be in fact more decentralized than a ﬁrm in which a part of
ﬁnancial and a part of administrative decisions are delegated.
7We opt not to use solely the answer to the question about R&D related decisions because it could
potentially generate a “mechanical” dependence between the left-hand side and right-hand side variables.
8at least intermediate level of delegation of ﬁnancial decisions.8 Finally, to check robustness
and for comparison, we also report our results (Table 8) when all answers are used by using
a set of dummy variables for each question: one for intermediate level of delegation and one
for intermediate or high level of delegation.
3 Results
We split our empirical results into three parts. First, we present evidence of robust cor-
relations between R&D expenditures and delegation. We then move on to analyze the
relationship between the ownership concentration and delegation to document that ﬁrms
that have highly concentrated ownership (such as family ﬁrms) which are larger (in terms
of employment size) are also more likely to be decentralized. On the other hand, ﬁrms with
more dispersed ownership that are larger are less likely to be decentralized. The ﬁnal part
of our results addresses the issue of determinants of delegation within ﬁrms. Our results
suggest that our measure of delegation is very likely quite diﬀerent than the one used in
Acemoglu et al (2007) since the determinants of delegation that that paper identiﬁes are not
good predictors of our measure of delegation for ﬁrms in our sample. Ownership concentra-
tion, on the other hand, seems to play an imporant role in the decisions of ﬁrms to become
more decentralized.
3.1 R&D Expenditures and Delegation
Since we are mainly interested in documenting the positive relationship between the R&D
spending and the level of delegation (or decentralization) in ﬁrms, it is crucial that we control
for the crucial determinants of R&D, especially those that could potentially be correlated
with the decision to delegate. The controls that we employ include the following. The level
of human capital is an important determinant of R&D as ﬁrms indending to do a lot of
R&D have also to hire many high-skilled workers. Similarly, ﬁrms are likely to delegate
more decisions if employees (or managers) are more skilled. Second important control is the
size of the ﬁrm. While small ﬁrms account for a large fraction of R&D activity, the level
of R&D spending of course depends on the ﬁnancial budget of each ﬁrm. Third important
control variable is the amount capital that is available per employee. Firms that have more
8We believe that the question about delegation of R&D is more about the discretion with respect to how
to spend a given budget within R&D, whereas the ﬁnancial delegation is about how to allocate funds across
diﬀerent budgets.
9high-level machinery, computers and expensive lab equipment are also more likely to engage
more in R&D.
Our ﬁrst exercise is a regression of the log of R&D expenditures on our measures of
delegation and above described ﬁrm controls: size of the ﬁrm, the level of human capital,
capital per worker and, depending on speciﬁcation, on industry (2-digits), region and time
ﬁxed eﬀects. To account for possible heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in error terms
(as our observation is a ﬁrm-year), we report Newey-West standard errors.9,10 We have 2,498
observations, i.e., years in which a ﬁrm reported R&D expenditures, revenues, the number
of workers, the number of employees with university degree, the level of capital, ownership
structure and answered at least some of the questions about delegation.
The results of these least squares regressions are reported in Table 4 and most are as
expected. Size of the ﬁrm (measured either by the number of employees or by revenues)
and the proportion of workers with university degree are positively correlated with R&D
expenditures. Ownership concentration does not appear to be signiﬁcantly related to R&D
in our sample, which suggests that whether or not a ﬁrm has a sole owner or its ownership is
widely dispersed is not related to the decision about how much to spend on R&D. Perhaps
counterintuitively, however, capital per worker is negatively correlated with R&D. This may
be caused by the fact that the ﬁrms in our sample are from manufacturing industry where
a lot of the capital owned by ﬁrms may not be related to R&D. The results are very stable
across speciﬁcations and robust to controlling for sectoral and/or provincial ﬁxed eﬀects or
provincial controls.
In Table 5 we add additional two controls: (logarithm of) value added per employee and
three dummy variables for the age of the ﬁrm. The results are in line with the previous table
and the amount of variation explained by the regression model increases only marginally.
Value added per employee is insigniﬁcant. As we might expect and in line with previous
ﬁndings, younger ﬁrms tend to invest more heavily in R&D.
To further verify robustness, we run the same regressions with the dependent variable
deﬁned as (the log of) R&D intensity: R&D expenditures as a fraction of revenues. The
results are reported in Table 7. As in the previous analysis, delegation covaries positively
with R&D expenditures. Younger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with higher fraction of university trained
employees also spend more on R&D. After controlling for sectoral and provincial variation,
9We allow for autocorrelation with a lag of 3 periods.
10We also estimated a model with standard errors corrected for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at
the ﬁrm level (ignoring the time-series dimension, but allowing for arbitraty covariance structure among
errors for observations of each ﬁrm) and standard errors were very close to the reported ones.
10value added is still not related in a signiﬁcant way to R&D. As found in the previous studies,
the size of the ﬁrm (measured by the number of employess) is insigniﬁcant.11 Surprisingly,
the ownership concentration is negatively related to R&D expenditures per euro of revenues.
To provide a more nuanced look at delegation of which decisions is perhaps more im-
portant for R&D expenditures, in Table 8 we report the results of the regressions where
separate dummy variables are included for each question in the questionnaire. Delegation
of ﬁnancial decisions exhibits the most signiﬁcant relationship with R&D spending. The
important step seems to be between “no delegation” and intermediate delegation, where
the additional degree of delegation (i.e., high level) does not contribute in a signiﬁcant way.
Delegation of administrative decisions exhibits an interesting non-monotonicity. While an
intermediate level of delegation is negatively related to R&D, as the ﬁrms delegate even more
administrative decisions the relationship becomes positive.
Since the results that we have discussed above and presented in the tables are very
robust, we believe that the extent of R&D spending in ﬁrms is related to the extent of
delegation of decision power within ﬁrms. Delegation of ﬁnancial decisions seems to be
especially important. There are several alternative channels through which this positive
relationship may appear. Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenan and Zilibotti (2007)
provide one possible model which generates this correlation by arguing that ﬁrms that do
more R&D in order to be at the frontier of the industry also need more skilled managers
and thus delegation is more likely as managers are assumed to be more knowledgeable than
the owners. In the previous version of this paper we provided an alternative agency model,
based on moral hazard and adverse selection, in which delegation increases R&D investment
since aﬀording more decision power to the manager improves his (private) marginal return
to investment in R&D and thus spurs innovation incentives. Without a good instrument,
however, it seems impossible to distinguish these two causal relationships directly and thus
to isolate the potential positive eﬀects of either channel on the correlation.
3.2 Delegation and Ownership Concentration
The relationship between delegation and ownership concentration has been previously stud-
ied in Shleifer and Vishny (1986). They looked at large, publicly traded, corporations and
the problem of takeovers and argued that ﬁrms with many small owners might suﬀer from
an increased free rider problem and thus monitoring of managers by the board might be
11This result is regarded as a stylized fact in the R&D literature - see, for example, Klette and Kortum
(2004).
11Table 2: Correlations between delegation of decisions and ownership concentra-
tion
Variable Ownership max(Q1-Q4) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Ownership Conc 1.00
Delegation (Q1-Q4) 0.039 1.00
Del. Q1: Administr. 0.026 0.743 1.00
Del. Q2: Financial -0.015 0.633 0.760 1.00
Del. Q3: Business 0.026 0.725 0.582 0.555 1.00
Del. Q4: R&D -0.009 0.609 0.508 0.527 0.656 1.00
Obs. 10,546
a problem since it is costly. Their main observation is that the beneﬁt from monitoring
the management is increasing in the controlled share and thus when the controlled share is
suﬃciently large, this shareholder might incur the monitoring cost. Shleifer and Vishny an-
alyzed a sample of Fortune 500 companies and found evidence consistent with their model.
Similarly, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) also provide a model generating positive
correlation between monitoring and ownership concentration. We can investigate this re-
lationship using our data, when we interpret our measure of delegation as the inverse of
monitoring. Recall that an advantage of our data is that we have diﬀerent measures of
delegation, since the ﬁrms answered separate questions about delegation of administrative,
ﬁnancial, busines and R&D-related decisions.
In Table 2 we report the raw unconditional correlations between the ownership concen-
tration (deﬁned as the normalized sum of squares of the three largest shareholders) and
diﬀerent measures of delegation in our sample. It is perhaps surprising that the overall cor-
relation is positive, even though not very large: 0.039. The negative correlation, which is the
relationship predicted by Shleifer and Vishny’s model is present for delegation of ﬁnancial
decisions and decisions related to R&D.
A possible explanation for the opposite relationship between delegation and ownership
concentration might be that our sample consists of manufacturing ﬁrms that are rather small
in size (especially when compared to Fortune 500 companies), and thus Shleifer and Vishny’s
logic may not necessarily apply. The main reason is that the monitoring cost might not be
constant across diﬀerent ownership structures. In fact it is reasonable that in many cases,
especially for small or medium size ﬁrms, an excessive ownership concentration requires
some minimum degree of delegation. For example, when a company is owned by a single
owner, there may be non-negligible gains from delegation to the extent that keeping a close
12Table 3: Conditional Correlations between delegation of decisions and ownership
concentration
Conditioning: Large Small L & Disp. L & Conc. S & Disp. S & Conc.
Del. (Q1-Q4) 0.237 0.066 -0.120 0.201 -0.008 0.061
Del. Q1: Adm. 0.139 0.049 -0.182 0.067 0.006 0.020
Del. Q2: Fin. 0.137 0.011 -0.190 0.116 -0.021 -0.014
Del. Q3: Bus. 0.231 0.038 -0.146 0.332 -0.014 0.036
Del. Q4: R&D 0.209 0.020 0.188 0.211 -0.011 0.009
Obs. 368 5355 58 310 1452 3903
a Large ﬁrms (L): 10th decile of employment size, Small ﬁrms (S): employment less than median
(495), Dispersed ownership (Disp): index less than 0.5, Concentrated ownership (Conc): index
more than 0.5.
control of all productive, administrative, ﬁnancial and marketing activities inﬂuenced by
ﬁrm’s employees is too costly, especially when the company exceeds some size threshold. On
the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that a slightly less concentrated ownership
structure (for example 2 owners with equal shares) allows owners to implement desired
monitoring level at lower costs, hence there is less need for delegation.
To provide some evidence for the last claim, in Table 3 we present correlations between the
ownership concentration and delegation conditional on the size of the ﬁrm and on whether
a ﬁrm has more or less concentrated ownership. Consistently with Shleifer and Vishny’s
results, for ﬁrms with dispersed ownership, which are likely to be similar to their sample,
the correlation between delegation and ownership concentration is negative. This correla-
tion is even more negative when we look at the large ﬁrms in our sample. On the other
hand, ﬁrms with concentrated ownership structure exhibit (with the exception of small ﬁrms
and delegation of ﬁnancial decisions) positive correlation between delegation and ownership
concentration. This positive relationship is even stronger when we examine large ﬁrms with
concentrated ownership, which suggests that perhaps either the cost of monitoring or the
beneﬁts to delegation or both are high for large ﬁrms with highly concentrated ownership
structure.
3.3 Determinants of Delegation
In a recent paper Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007) (AALVRZ)
propose a framework to analyze the relationship between decentralization of ﬁrms and the
diﬀusion of new technologies. Using French and British data sets they provide evidence that
13ﬁrms close to the technological frontier, ﬁrms in more heterogeneous environments and ﬁrms
that are younger tend to be more likely to be decentralized. The measure of decentralization
that AALVRZ employ is based on ﬁrms organizing themselves into proﬁt centers. The
idea is that managers of proﬁt centers concern themselves with all aspects of the business
aﬀecting the proﬁtability. Under the alternative organization into cost centers or production
centers, the manager is reponsible for fulﬁlling cost or productions target, instead. Therefore,
typically, ﬁrm delegates more authority to managers of proﬁt centers. Our data does not
contain information about whether or not a ﬁrm is organized into proﬁt centers. The question
about ﬁnancial delegation which we used in our analyses is quite likely reﬂecting other aspects
of internal organization since over 80% of ﬁrms answer positively, whereas only about 30%
of ﬁrms in the AALVRZ sample are organized into proﬁt centers. Nevertheless, we can
construct the measures that AALVRZ found to be important determinants of ﬁrms’ decision
to organize themselves into proﬁt centers and ask whether these measures are important in
explaining the diﬀerent delegation decisions of ﬁrms in our sample.
In particular, we construct a measure of heterogeneity as the dispersion of ﬁrm produc-
tivity growth and levels within four-digit industry. Heterogeneity (in levels) in four-digit







P is the P th percentile of the distribution of productivity level across all ﬁrms
in indsutry l. Further we construct a measure of the frontier by taking the 99th percentile12 of
the distribution of labor productivity and we also use the dummies for young, medium-aged
and old ﬁrms. The results from the probit regressions are reported in Table 9. These results
are rather surprising. Virtually none of these measures seems be an important determinant
of delegation as deﬁned by the questions in our questionnaire. One of the few exceptions is
the delegation of adminitrative decisions (and to certain extent also delegation of business
decisions), which seems to be more likely in more heterogeneous industries. Unfortunately,
when the heterogeneity is measured in growth rates of productivity rather than levels, this
relationship disappears.
There is some limited evidence that cross-country diﬀerences are quite important for
the determinants of decentralization already in Acemoglu et al. (2007). In particular,
the authors present results from the British manufacturing industry in Table 5 and, for
12As in AALVRZ, by not taking the maximum we try to avoid the problem with potential outliers due to
a measurement error.
14example, the younger ﬁrms which tend to be decentralized in France are less decentralized
(even though the coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations) in Britain. The control
for the productivity frontier is insigniﬁcant as in most of our speciﬁcations. Of course one
possible explanation for our results is that the data sets (or variables) are not comparable.
In Table 10 we ﬁnd that ownership concentration seems to be an important determinant
of delegation – Table 3 documents that ownership structure and decentralization are indeed
systematically correlated. Of course, we want to exercise care in interpreting the results as
causal: ownership concentration might be clearly an endogenous decision.13 There are many
plausible stories in which ﬁrms’ ownership structure seems to inﬂuence delegation and not
the other way around. For instance, situations in which changes in the ownership structure of
ﬁrms are more ‘costly’ or simply take more time than shifts in the control power of managers,
which might be simply implemented by setting up more or less high-powered incentives or by
the implicit use of replacement threats, would be in line with this interpretation. This seems
to be the case also for family ﬁrms, for which changes in the ownership structure are rather
rare over time and occur mainly by way of inheritance. In practice, however, there might be
many other cases where the causal relationship goes in the opposite direction. Addressing
this endogeneity issue seems a fundamental starting point for future research on this ground.
Summing up, from our exercise we conclude that diﬀerent delegation decisions might
be driven by diﬀerent forces. While AALVRZ provide convincing evidence that organizing
ﬁrms into proﬁt centers is inﬂuenced by the heterogeneity of environment in which the ﬁrm
operates, ﬁrm’s age, and its distance to the frontier, whether the Italian ﬁrms in our sample
delegate administrative, ﬁnancial, commercial or R&D decisions seems not be inﬂuenced by
these factors. More research – both theoretical and empirical – is needed to provide more
nuanced answers to ﬁnd determinants of a particular type of delegation.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the relationship between delegation and innovation incentives. Our em-
pirical results provide evidence that R&D activity exhibits a positive relationship with the
decision of ﬁrms to adopt organizational structures relying more on delegation. This pos-
itive correlation is robust to controlling for the determinants of R&D within ﬁrms such as
the level of human capital, capital intensity, sectoral and regional eﬀects and to using dif-
ferent measures of R&D. We also investigate the determinants of delegation in our sample.
13See e.g. Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
15We have also found a positive correlation between ownership concentration and delegation,
which goes against the ﬁndings of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Moreover, variables found
as important determinants of delegation in French manufacturing by Acemoglu, Aghion,
Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007) do not appear important in our sample, and some
even exhibit qualitatively opposite eﬀect. These disparities can perhaps be explained by
diﬀerences in the studied samples and observed variables, and call for further studies of
cross-country diﬀerences.
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18Appendix: The Capitalia Sample
Our main data source is a sample of Italian ﬁrms in the manufacturing industry collected
in surveys distributed in years 1997, 2000 and 2003 by an Italian investment bank, Medio-
credito Centrale (now Capitalia). The Capitalia Survey is the most important, periodically
repeated, quantitative-qualitative survey of Italian ﬁrms. The survey has been repeated ev-
ery three years, starting from 1989, on a sample of around 4,500 ﬁrms with (weakly) more
than 10 employees. In order to maintain representativeness and take into account the high
exit/entry rate of ﬁrms in the Italian market, the original sample has been reshaped for
each wave. The diﬀerent waves have been stratiﬁed by size classes based on the number of
employees, geographical areas and macrosectors according to the Pavitt (1984) classiﬁcation.
The value added per employee has been used as a stratifying factor. Each wave contains sep-
arate questions for each of the three previous years – and answered various questions from
3 distinct categories: (i) balance sheet data, (ii) measurable company characteristics for
each year in the 1995-2003 period, and (iii) questionnaire data regarding ﬁrm’s relationship
with customers and suppliers, details on competitive environment, industry characteristics,
ownership structure and other qualitative information.
As reported by Becchetti, Castelli and Hasan (2009), all balance sheet data in the
Capitalia Survey database are accurately checked. These data come from oﬃcial sources:
the CERVED database (ﬁrst sample period) and AIDA – Bureau Van Dijk database (last
two sample periods) which collects from CERVED all balance sheets for the same ﬁrms.
CERVED obtains the information from the Italian Chambers of Commerce and is currently
the most authoritative and reliable source of information on Italian companies. Qualitative
data from questionnaire are ﬁlled by a representative appointed by the ﬁrm collecting in-
formation from the relevant ﬁrm division. The questionnaire has a system of controls based
on ‘long inconsistencies’, namely inconsistencies between answers to questions placed at a
certain distance in the questionnaire. In case of inconsistent information the ﬁrm is subject
to a second phone interview. Firms which do not provide reliable information after being
recontacted are excluded from the sample. A supplementary list of 8,000 ﬁrms is built for
each of the three year surveys in order to avoid that exclusions generated by missing answers
or inaccuracies in the questionnaire, may alter the sample design. Substitutions follow the
criteria of consistency between the sample size and the population of the universe.
The unit of observation is the ﬁrm, not its plants or establishments. The procedures
for data collection are mixed: a sampling procedure was adopted for ﬁrms hiring less than
500 employees. The stratiﬁcation was made according to size, industry and location. The
19sample dimension for each stratum was determined according to the Neyman’s formula, so
as to allow rescaling to the universe at the level of each administrative geographical region.
For ﬁrms with more than 500 employees the survey covers the entire universe. Overall,
the survey constitutes a statistically signiﬁcant representation of the Italian manufacturing
industry: 10% of the manufacturing total and 24% of national export as pointed out in the
report on the 8th wave (Capitalia, 2002).
In the following we shall describe in more detail some of the relevant variables used in
our empirical exercises. All monetary variables were reported in Italian liras prior to 2001
and in euros thereafter. We convert liras into euros by dividing by 1,936.27, which was the
rate ﬁxed during the transition to euro. We used the CPI to express all monetary variables
in 2003 prices.
R&D Expenditures: The deﬁnition of R&D expenditures used in the questionnaire is
fairly broad: it includes expenditures on (i) product innovation activities including intro-
duction of new products and quality improvements of old products; (ii) process innovation
activities including introduction of new and more eﬃcient production processes and quality
improvements of old production processes; and (iii) any activity linked to a better organiza-
tion and management of innovations.
Ownership Concentration: The questionnaire provides data about the shares’ percentage
of the three largest shareholders.
Delegation: Four questions in the questionnaire distributed among ﬁrms ask whether or
not administrative, ﬁnancial, business and R&D-related decisions within ﬁrms are made
autonomously by separate divisions. For each question, diﬀerent divisions are asked to pick
one of the options: “no delegation”, “intermediate level”and “high level”of delegation. More
precisely, in the questionnaire each is asked the following question: “for each of the following
type of decisions – administrative, ﬁnancial, sales management and R&D – report the degree
of autonomy from the headquarter”. The three possible answers where: (1) decisions are
fully controlled by the headquarter, (2) there is some degree of autonomy, and (3) decisions
are taken in full autonomy.
Human Capital Index: is deﬁned as the fraction of employees with any university degree
among the total workforce of that ﬁrm.
Capital Intensity: is deﬁned as the amount of physical capital per worker.
20Table 4: Relationship between delegation and log R&D expenditures
Dependent variable: log (R&D Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delegation 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.39
(0.15)∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗
Delegation (Financial) 0.2 0.22 0.18 0.16
(0.11)∗ (0.11)∗∗ (0.11) (0.11)
Human Capital Index 3.07 3.11 2.53 2.57 2.88 2.88 2.89 2.89
(0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.4)∗∗∗ (0.4)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.42)∗∗∗ (0.4)∗∗∗ (0.4)∗∗∗
log Capital Intensity -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.10 -.09 -.10 -.09
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)∗ (0.06)
Workers 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0000943)∗∗∗ (0.0000939)∗∗∗ (0.0000857)∗∗∗ (0.0000852)∗∗∗ (0.0000843)∗∗∗ (0.0000849)∗∗∗ (0.0000868)∗∗∗ (0.000087)∗∗∗
log Revenue 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.64
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗
Ownership 0.02 0.04 -.04 -.02 -.13 -.11 -.12 -.10
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Industry Dummies (22) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No No No Yes Yes No No
Provincial Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 2,498 2,495 2,498 2,495 2,388 2,385 2,354 2,351
R2 0.3614 0.3602 0.4192 0.4173 0.4798 0.4773 0.4584 0.4561
a Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in parentheses.
b *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
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1Table 5: Relationship between delegation and log R&D expenditures
Dependent variable: log (R&D Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delegation 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.37
(0.15)∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗
Delegation (Financial) 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.19
(0.11)∗∗ (0.11)∗∗ (0.11)∗∗ (0.11)∗
Human Capital Index 3.15 3.19 2.57 2.59 2.85 2.85 2.87 2.88
(0.38)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.37)∗∗∗ (0.37)∗∗∗
log Value Added per Empl -.03 -.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
log Capital Intensity -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.04
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Workers 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0000958)∗∗∗ (0.0000956)∗∗∗ (0.0000874)∗∗∗ (0.0000873)∗∗∗ (0.0000869)∗∗∗ (0.0000881)∗∗∗ (0.00009)∗∗∗ (0.0000907)∗∗∗
log Revenue 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.63
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗
Ownership -.02 -.009 -.08 -.06 -.18 -.17 -.16 -.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Firm age < 5 years 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.6 0.55 0.58
(0.28)∗ (0.27)∗ (0.22)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗ (0.24)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗∗ (0.22)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 years 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.33 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.4
(0.21)∗ (0.21)∗ (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)∗∗ (0.2)∗∗ (0.2)∗ (0.21)∗
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.19 -.20 -.15 -.17 -.19 -.21 -.16 -.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Industry Dummies (22) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No No No Yes Yes No No
Provincial Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 2,482 2,479 2,482 2,479 2,373 2,370 2,339 2,336
R2 0.3668 0.3665 0.4228 0.4219 0.4847 0.4832 0.4631 0.4618
a Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in parentheses.
b *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
c The omitted category for ﬁrm age is Age≥ 20 years. See text for variable deﬁnitions.
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2Table 6: Relationship between delegation and log R&D expenditures (last year per survey)
Dependent variable: log (R&D Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delegation 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.49
(0.2)∗∗∗ (0.2)∗∗∗ (0.2)∗∗∗ (0.19)∗∗∗
Delegation (Financial) 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26
(0.14)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗ (0.13)∗
Human Capital Index 3.29 3.33 2.79 2.82 3.28 3.24 3.17 3.16
(0.48)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.48)∗∗∗ (0.49)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.36)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗∗∗
log Value Added per Empl -.04 -.04 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.09 0.09
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
log Capital Intensity -.04 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.16 -.15 -.04 -.04
(0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗ (0.02)∗ (0.09)∗ (0.09)∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗
Workers 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0000801)∗∗∗ (0.0000796)∗∗∗ (0.0000755)∗∗∗ (0.000075)∗∗∗ (0.0000885)∗∗∗ (0.000089)∗∗∗ (0.0000894)∗∗∗ (0.0000898)∗∗∗
log Revenue 0.57 0.58 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.58 0.58
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
Ownership 0.02 0.04 -.03 -.005 -.13 -.11 -.10 -.07
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Firm age < 5 years 0.52 0.57 0.6 0.65 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.54
(0.35) (0.33)∗ (0.29)∗∗ (0.27)∗∗ (0.29)∗ (0.28)∗∗ (0.28)∗ (0.27)∗∗
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 years 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.3 0.27 0.29
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.32 -.34 -.28 -.30 -.33 -.36 -.33 -.36
(0.17)∗ (0.17)∗∗ (0.16)∗ (0.16)∗ (0.17)∗ (0.17)∗∗ (0.17)∗ (0.17)∗∗
Industry Dummies (22) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No No No Yes Yes No No
Provincial Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 855 854 855 854 818 817 806 805
R2 0.3602 0.3580 0.4283 0.4257 0.4894 0.4866 0.4673 0.4648
a Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix on 4-digit industry level in parentheses.
b *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
c The omitted category for ﬁrm age is Age≥ 20 years. See text for variable deﬁnitions.
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3Table 7: Relationship between delegation and log R&D expenditures normalized by revenues
Dependent variable: log (R&D Expenditures / Revenues)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delegation 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.4
(0.17)∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗∗ (0.16)∗∗
Delegation (Financial) 0.29 0.3 0.26 0.25
(0.12)∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.12)∗∗ (0.11)∗∗
Human Capital Index 3.22 3.25 2.72 2.73 2.99 2.97 2.95 2.94
(0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.41)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗
log Value Added per Empl -.16 -.16 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.07)∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.09) (0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.1)
log Capital Intensity -.05 -.05 -.27 -.26 -.23 -.22 -.25 -.24
(0.02)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗
Workers 0.0000662 0.0000659 -.0000145 -.0000154 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001
(0.0000621) (0.000062) (0.0000604) (0.0000602) (0.0000656)∗ (0.0000655)∗ (0.0000656)∗ (0.0000655)∗
Ownership -.22 -.21 -.25 -.24 -.33 -.32 -.32 -.30
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)∗ (0.14)∗ (0.14)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗ (0.14)∗∗
Firm age < 5 years 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.5 0.54
(0.31) (0.3) (0.22)∗∗ (0.22)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 year 0.38 0.39 0.27 0.3 0.39 0.41 0.32 0.34
(0.22)∗ (0.22)∗ (0.2) (0.2) (0.21)∗ (0.21)∗ (0.21) (0.21)
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.09 -.11 -.10 -.12 -.10 -.12 -.10 -.13
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Industry Dummies (22) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No No No Yes Yes No No
Provincial Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 2,482 2,479 2,482 2,479 2,373 2,370 2,339 2,336
R2 0.0823 0.0829 0.1728 0.1725 0.2662 0.2649 0.2322 0.2309
a Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in parentheses.
b *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
c The omitted category for ﬁrm age is Age≥ 20 years. See text for variable deﬁnitions.
2
4Table 8: Relationship between delegation and log R&D expenditures (separate answers to
survey questions)
Dependent variable: log (R&D Expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medium Delegation of Administrative Decisions -.23 -.35 -.31 -.34
(0.15) (0.14)∗∗ (0.16)∗∗ (0.15)∗∗
Medium Delegation of Financial Decisions 0.42 0.61 0.52 0.56
(0.14)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗ (0.15)∗∗∗
Medium Delegation of Business Decisions -.02 -.13 -.10 -.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Medium or High Delegation of Administrative Decisions 0.23 0.43 0.53 0.59
(0.24) (0.23)∗ (0.23)∗∗ (0.23)∗∗
Medium or High Delegation of Financial Decisions -.05 -.29 -.29 -.35
(0.22) (0.2) (0.21) (0.2)∗
Medium or High Delegation of Business Decisions -.03 0.08 -.02 -.09
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Human Capital Index 3.12 2.45 2.73 2.74
(0.38)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗∗∗ (0.37)∗∗∗
log Value Added per Empl -.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
log Capital Intensity -.05 -.04 -.04 -.04
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗
Workers 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0000952)∗∗∗ (0.0000864)∗∗∗ (0.0000853)∗∗∗ (0.0000883)∗∗∗
log Revenue 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.62
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗
Ownership -.04 -.14 -.22 -.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Firm age < 5 years 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.58
(0.28)∗ (0.22)∗∗∗ (0.23)∗∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 years 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.41
(0.21)∗ (0.21)∗ (0.2)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.21 -.19 -.23 -.21
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)∗ (0.13)∗
Industry Dummies (22) No Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No Yes No
Provincial Controls No No No Yes
Obs. 2,467 2,467 2,358 2,324
R2 0.3727 0.4333 0.4935 0.4733
a Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in parentheses.
b *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
c The omitted category for ﬁrm age is Age≥ 20 years. See text for variable deﬁnitions.
25Table 9: Probit of delegation of decisions
Dependent variable: Firm delegates decisions
Q1-Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Heterogeneity (level) 0.16 0.16 0.23 -.008 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.01
(95th − 5th percentile) (0.07)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)∗∗ (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Frontier, 99th percentile -.01 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.0001 -.005
(ln yFl) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)∗ (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
log Value Added per Empl 0.07 0.04 0.009 -.02 -.06 0.04 0.006 -.05 -.07
(ln yil) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)∗
Firm age < 5 years 0.34 0.51 0.48 -.18 -.40 0.54 0.36 0.05 -.09
(0.26) (0.25)∗∗ (0.26)∗ (0.17) (0.17)∗∗ (0.24)∗∗ (0.25) (0.18) (0.19)
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 years 0.05 0.18 0.03 -.02 -.18 -.19 -.44 -.08 -.23
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.1) (0.11)∗ (0.1)∗ (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.1)∗∗
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.19 -.07 -.11 -.04 -.07 -.12 -.24 -.03 -.08
(0.08)∗∗ (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.07)
Workers 0.0000159 0.0000394 0.0000748 7.36e-06 0.0000378 7.65e-06 0.0000575 -.0000767 -.0000819
(0.0000424) (0.0000476) (0.000067) (0.0000314) (0.0000386) (0.000037) (0.0000479) (0.0000337)∗∗ (0.0000394)∗∗
Human Capital Index 0.42 -.18 -.26 -.003 0.008 0.19 0.08 -.43 -.66
(0.29) (0.2) (0.25) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.18)∗∗ (0.21)∗∗∗
Industry Dummies (22) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 4,532 4,689 4,033 4,686 4,246 4,643 3,995 4,601 4,119
Mean of dependent variable 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.78
a Probit coeﬃcients (not marginal eﬀects) are reported.
b Q1: Delegation of administrative decisions, Q2: ﬁnancial decisions, Q3: business decisions, Q4: R&D decisions.
c Robust standard errors (not corrected for autocorrelation) in parentheses.
d *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
e The omitted category for ﬁrm age is Age≥ 20 years. See text for variable deﬁnitions.
2
6Table 10: Probit of delegation of decisions (with ownership concentration)
Dependent variable: Firm delegates decisions
Q1-Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Heterogeneity (level) 0.2 0.19 0.28 0.005 0.1 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.03
(95th − 5th percentile) (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)∗∗ (0.07)∗ (0.05) (0.06)
Frontier, 99th percentile -.004 0.04 0.1 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.008 -.0005
(ln yFl) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)∗∗ (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
log Value Added per Empl 0.05 0.03 0.008 -.02 -.06 0.03 -.01 -.06 -.08
(ln yil) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)∗
Firm age < 5 years 0.3 0.48 0.46 -.19 -.42 0.53 0.35 0.05 -.08
(0.26) (0.25)∗∗ (0.25)∗ (0.17) (0.17)∗∗ (0.24)∗∗ (0.24) (0.18) (0.18)
5 ≤ Firm age < 10 years -.007 0.15 -.001 -.05 -.25 -.21 -.46 -.10 -.24
(0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.1) (0.11)∗∗ (0.1)∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.09) (0.1)∗∗
10 ≤ Firm age < 20 years -.21 -.06 -.09 -.06 -.09 -.13 -.25 -.03 -.09
(0.08)∗∗∗ (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.06) (0.07)
Ownership 0.49 0.29 0.36 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.18 0.25
(0.09)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.07)∗∗∗ (0.08)∗∗∗
Workers -.000022 0.0000114 0.0000454 -.0000186 -4.85e-06 0.0000239 0.0000838 -.0000769 -.000084
(0.0000403) (0.0000454) (0.000062) (0.0000337) (0.0000402) (0.0000369) (0.0000511) (0.0000343)∗∗ (0.0000405)∗∗
Human Capital Index 0.37 -.28 -.46 0.09 0.01 0.16 -.01 -.44 -.72
(0.3) (0.21) (0.25)∗ (0.2) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.19)∗∗ (0.22)∗∗∗
Industry Dummies (22) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial Dummies (107) No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 4,377 4,529 3,903 4,503 4,064 4,488 3,858 4,453 3,986
Mean of dependent variable 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.78
a Probit coeﬃcients (not marginal eﬀects) are reported.
b Q1: Delegation of administrative decisions, Q2: ﬁnancial decisions, Q3: business decisions, Q4: R&D decisions.
c Robust standard errors (not corrected for autocorrelation) in parentheses.
d *,**,*** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level respectively
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Abstract   
We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive relation- ship between delegation of 
decisions within organizations and involvement in research and development. This positive correlation is robust to 
controlling for the determi- nants of R&D within firms such as the level of human capital, capital intensity, sec- 
toral and regional effects and to using different measures of R&D. We also investigate the determinants of 
delegation in our sample. We find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and delegation, which 
goes against the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). We also find that variables found as important 
determinants of delegation in French manufacturing by Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti 
(2007) do not appear important in our sample, and some even exhibit qualita- tively opposite effect. These 
disparities can perhaps be explained by differences in the studied samples and observed variables, and call for 
further studies of cross-country differences. 
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